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the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
DATED this
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

, tday of January 2009.
\2-

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD AND KEEP

For the Supreme Court

Plaintiff-Respondent,

rnldw L
I
m
Stephen W. Kenyon, ~ l e #

CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN,
Defendant-Appellant.

A

CC:
)
)

Bomeville County District Court Nos. 20065769 (2006-1432712006-1723612006-19594)

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
Court Reporter Jack Fuller
Court Reporter Tom McMinn

MOTION
TO AUGMENT RECORD AND MOTION TO KEEP SUSPENSION OF

BRIEFING SCHEDULE IN PLACE with attachment was filed by counsel for Appellant on
November 24,2008. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD be, and
hereby is, GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the transcript listed
below with this Court within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order and the District Court
Clerk shall immediately serve counsel and file the transcript with this Court. Any corrections shall
be filed with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30.1:
I

1. Transcript of the February 12, 2008, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Withdraw his
plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents

listed below, items which were NOT submitted with this Motion and not contained in this record on
appeal, and the District Court Clerk shall submit to this Court the requested documents at the same
time as the transcript listed above:

;. Court Minutes from the February 12, 2008, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Withdraw
his plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594; and

'2. The district court's March 20, 2008, Memorandum Decision denying Appellant's
''dotion to Withdraw his plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that proceedings in this appeal shall remain SUSPENDED
until the transcript and the requested documents listed above are filed with this Court, at which time
the due date for filing Appellant's Brief shall be reset.

AUGMENTATiON RECORD

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD

)

v.

Supreme Court Docket No. 339 14-2007
(33915-2007133916-2007133917-2007)
Bonneville County District Court Nos.
2006-5769, 2006-14327,2006- 17236,
2006- 19594

)

CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN,

1

Defendant-Appellant.

II

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Appellant on June 12,2009. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below,
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea (CR-06- 19594), file-stamped October 1, 2007;
2. Minute Entry (CR-2006- 19594), dated February 12,2008;
3. Order Re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and Objection to Memorandum
Decision (CR-2006- 19594), file-stamped March 20, 2008; and
4. Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and Objection to
Memorandum Decision (CR-06- 19594), file-stamped March 20, 2008.
DATED this

zf:ay

l

of June 2009.

For the Supreme Court

11

V

I

Stephen W. Ken

cc: Counsel of Record
/
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Summary :

1 0 / 2 6 / a o o 6 I had r e c e i v e d rrnonymoue ihformation t h a t Curtis Qlenn Hartehorn was a t I n t e r m t a t e ~ a c y c l i n g
l o c a t a d 3755 North Yellowetone i n B o m e v i l l e County. I wae a v a r a t h a t M r . Hartehorn had w a r r a n t s for h i e
arreet (refer t o case r e p o r t 2 0 0 6 - 0 6 3 0 9 ) . Deputy Byington ahd n y e e l f rtaponded to I n e c r s t a t e ~ e ~ ~ c l i n1g .

on

conracted Mr. Hartshorn j u e c i n s i d e t h e fonc door of t h e b u e i n e e e . I rcoognized h i m be C u r t i e Qlenn
Harcaharn (hs ham been a cluspect ip sevef.al copper w l r s t h e f t caret3 T have bean working) I e a i d t o him,
. .- 'how are you doing h r . Hartahornu. M r . Hartehorn denied t h a t he wae in f a c t M r . Hartehorn. I r w p l i i n e d t o

F

him t h a t I knaw h e was i n fact Mx. Xartahorn and aeksd f o r h i e identification. M r . H a r t e
n s t a r t e d to
proceed cowarde t h a back o f t h a buainees l o c a t a d co t h e norm. ( I had bean i n t h e bua sea before and knaw
t h e r e w a s a b a c k ~ d o o rt o t h e businees). Deputy Byington had taken a p o e i t i o n o u t s i d e t o t h e back 0C t h e
businaea ae we had concern8 t h a t M r . Hartshorn would t r y Po r u n from us. X a t t e m p t e d t o c o n t a c t Deputy
Byington on my portable r a d i o to n o t l f y him of M r . Hatteharn'e movemente, the b a t t e r y on my r a d i o rraa dend.
M r . Hartnhorn dttampced t o t r y an opan t h e overhead door b u t i t wae s e c u r e d . A t that: time Deputy ByingCon
had came i n s i d e t h e b u e i n e e s and s h o u t e d t o Hartshorn. M r . Wartehorn ~ u r n e dand t r i a d t o r u n towards the
f r o n t of t h e buaincse. Deputy Byingron and myself rare a b l e t o atap i n h i e way ahd M r . Hartshorn e t o p p t d
and t h e n walked around a p a l l e t t h a t contained staoks of red c o l o r e d i h s u l a c e d copper wire. M r . Hartshorn
picked up one of the piecee of t h e w i r e , which was approximately five t6 ~ l i xf e e t i n l e n g t h . ( I later
l e a r n e d that t h e w i r e h e picked up weighed eighteen pounde). M r . H a r t s h o r n h e l d t h e r L r e over h i s s h o u l d e r
( l i k e someone h o l d i h g a baseball b a t p r e p a r i n g t o swing), i n a t h r e a t e n i n g manner towarde u s . Both ~ e p u t y
Byington and myself . o r d e r e d Mr. Hartshorn s e v e r a l timas t o drop t h e w i r e and g e t an cha ground i n which he
-..-.-wauld noc com~-~'1-6~FTb-l373f;-'B~rEeEorn--~r
h~d-a--vlartanr-f o r - - h i - ~ - a r r a st . and. we-.conb-hued-.toot e1.I-him.. t o
drop tho o b j e c t . M r . Hartshorn s t a r t e d t o walk towards Deputy Byington e t i l l h o l d i n g t h e wire i n a
t h r e a t e n i n g manner. M r . H a r t r h o r n stopped and then s t a r t e d t o walk around t h e p a l l e t i n my d i r e c t i o n s t i l l
holding the wire o v e r h i e shoulder. I f e l t i~ m y mind chat Mr. H a r r s h o r n was trying t o d e c i d e which o f f i c e r
t o t r y and a t t a c k . X bad my hand on my weapon and e t a r c e d t o draw my weapon o u t of my h o l e t a r and backed up
co k e e p distance between ue s t i l l o r d e r i n g M r . Harcahorn t o d r o p t h e o b j e c t . Peputy Byington had c o l d Mr.
H a r t ~ h o t nt h a t he wae going co use pepper Bpray on him. Mr. Hartehorn s t i l l r e f u s e d a l l o r d e r s t o drop t h e
o b j e c t . Deputy Byington e p t a y e d M r . h a r t s h o r n i n che f a c e w i t h p e p p s r a p r a y . A f t e r s e v e r a l eecondn M r .
Hartshorn dropped t h e o b j e c t , s t i l l r e f u e h g ordere t o g e t down on t h e ground and p l a c e h i s hand8 behind
h i o back. n t thak time Deputy C . 9miCh arrlved and took M r . Hartshorn t o t h e ground and was able t o g e t M r .
Hsrtehorn'e arms behind h i e back. I p l a c e d handcuff0 on him and double l o c k e d them. nn arnhulancm was c a l l e d
t o r r t a t M r . Hartahorn for t h e p e p p e r rrptay and a l a o M r . H a r t s h o r n had complained of a p r i o r iajury ha had
t o h i e hand. M r . Hartehorn was t r e a t a d by t h e ambulance and t h e n t r a n s p o r t e d EO che h o a p i t a l t o have h i s
hand looked a t .

'.._

cf''

.

During a pat down of M r . H a r t s h o r n there were e e v e r a l drivers l i c e n e e e and a U.S. Bank d e b i t card belonging
t o other people l o c a t e d on h i s p a r s o n . Upon contacc with Cheryl Bmvcrland t h e owner of t h e dobit card1 she
sdviwcd she hed given t h e c a r d t o a friend of here by t h e name of K.C. Wheeler to use to d e l l iterne on EBAY
over a y s a r sgo. Cheryl advieed t h e friend had access t o a computer 'a American Auto, ( i t muec be n o t e d
thac C u r t i a Harrghorn ie lieted e e the owner of m e r i c a n AUCO f n ILEADS). Cheryl cold m e that Wheeler Cold
h e r t h a t Amcrioan Auro had bean broken i n t o and h e r c a r d @as a c o l e n o u t of the safe Chat h a d b e a n i n t h e
bueinesa. Cbcryl s a i d t h a t c s r d was used for numerous f r a u d u l e n t c h a r g e s on t h e I n t e r n a r in which s h e f i l e d
L
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IN THE DISTFUCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTNCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
STATE OF IDAHO,

1
)

Plaiiltiff,

CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN,

1

Case No. CR-2006-19594

)
)
)

MINUTE ENTRY

1
)

Defendant.

1
1

STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER

This matter came on for hearing on defendant's Objection & Verified Motion for
Disqualificatioil with Cause and Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea on February 12, 2008 at 9:30
A.M., before the Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho
Falls, Idaho.
Ms. Karen Konvalinlta, Court Repoi-ter, and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk,
were present.
Mr. Randolph Neal appeared 011 behalf of the State.
The defendant appeared by telephone on his ow11 behalf.
The Coui-t noted that the defendant's nlotion for disqualification was resolved.
Mr. Hartshom presented argument supporting his request for credit for time served. Mr.
Neal argued in opposition to defendant's request for credit. Mr. Hartshorn presented additional
argument sul~poi-tingthe motion.
The Court took the matter under adviseinent.
Mr. Hai-tshorn presented argument suppoi-ting his illation to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr.

MINUTE ENTRY - 1

Neal argued in opposition to defendant's motion. Mr. Hartshorn presented additional argument
supporting defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea.
The Court took the inatter under advisement.
Court was thus adjourned.
)

c: Prosecutor
CL~-tis
Hal-tshoril

MINUTE ENTRY - 2

2,- 0 4 -

GREGORY S. ANDERSON
District Judge

.-

DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JtJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
BONNEVZLLE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
'Ghb ldR23 a,,

"3

'N".

IS

STATE OF IDAHO,
P 1aintiff,
ORDER RE: MOTION TO
WITltllDRAW A L F O D PILEA AND

-vs.-

1

CURTIS GLENN HARTSHOW,
Defendant.

1
1

OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM

DECISION

)

1
This cause having come before this Court pursuant to Hartshorn's October 1,
2007, Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and October 16,2007, Objection to the Court's

September 20.2007, Memorandum Decision (motion for reconsideration), and this Court
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing;

NOW, THEREFORE:
Hartshorn's motion to withdraw Aljbrd plea is denied.
Hartshorn's motion for reconsideration is denied.
+h

DATED this

2

day of March 2008.

*

.a.

GREGORY S. ANDERSON
District Judge

STATE APPELLATE
PUBL!C DEFENDER

ORDER RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND OBJECTION TO
MEMORANDUM DECTSTON - I.

04/30; 008 '19:0 7 FAX

*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2 0

I hereby ccrtity that on this
day of March 2008,1 did send a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse
mailbox; or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.

Curtis Glenn Hartshorn
ISCI Unit 14
Post Office Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

Bonneville County Prosecutor's Office
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

ORDER RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND OBJECTION TO
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 2

.

.

-- .

B

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS?&Q~ OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B O ~ E V ,
~ ~ U ~ ~ ~
77$-'3 r,+
BoQaJ' ,:!
7, c;?. J: i s
a;

[r,.q

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
-vs.-

1
1
1
1
1
)

CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN,
Defendant.

1
1
1

,3;,?@r
F&,,C

-*<+{.

' F Co

.,d

L~~

Case No. CR-06- 19594

Y

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:
MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD
PLEA AND OBJECTION TO
MEMORANDUM DECISION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2006, Curtis Hartshorn was sentenced in Cases No. CR-20065769 for delivery of a controlled substance, CR-2006-14327 for escape, CR-2006-17236
for issuing a check without funds and CR-2006-19594 for grand theft. Each case is
unrelated to the others.
In Case No. CR-2006-5769, the court revoked probation and inlposed the origillal

0

sentence of a three-year determinate tenn followed by an indeterminate tern1 of seven
sentence is subject to 321 days credit for time served prior to sentencing.
In Case No. CR-2006-14327, the court sentenced Hartshorn to a one-year

term to be served consecutively to the sentence in Case No. CR-2006-5769.
is subject to 113 days credit for time served prior to sentencing.
k

In Case No. CR-2006-17236, the Couit sentenced Hartshorn to a determinate term
of three years to be served concurrently with the sentence in Case No. CR-2006-5769
The sentence is subject to 113 days credit for tiine served prior to sentencing.
tenn
In Case No. CR-2006-19594, the Court sentenced Hartshorn to a n~inimuil~
of four years to be followed by an indeternlinate term of eight years. The sentence is to
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTlON TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM DECISION - 1

be served concurrently with the sentences in Cases No. CR-2006-5769 and CR-2006-

17236. The sentence is subject to 1 13 days credit for time served prior to sentencing.
On September 13,2007, Hartshorn filed an identical motion for credit for time
served in each of the listed cases.
On September 20,2007, the court entered a Menlorandurn Decision Re: Motions
for Credit for Time Served, which denied Hartshorn's motions.
Hartshorn filed a Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea on October I , 2007.
On October 16, 2007, Hartshorn filed an Objection and Verified Motioil for
Disqualificatio~lWICause objecting to the September 20,2007, Memorandum ~ e c i s i o n . '

11. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION
A. Motion to Withdraw AZford Plea
The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the
discretion of the trial court. State v. Dye, 124 Idaho 250, 253, 858 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct.
App. 1993).

B. Motion to Reconsider
"The decisioil to grant or deny a request for recoilsideration generally rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court." Jordon v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592. 21 P.3d 908,

914 (2001); Carnell v. Barker*Manuger~zent,Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329, 48 P.3d 65 1, 658

(2002).

I

An Order for Self Disqualification was entered on October 3. 2007 by Judge Tinge)!. On October 10,
2007, Judge Anderson was assigned this case. Consequently, Hartshorn's Motion for Disqualification is
moot and need not be addressed in this decision. Hartshorn's Objection appears to be a ]notion for
reconsideration and will be handled as such by this Court.

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND
OBJECTION TO MEMOR4NDUM DECISION - 2

111. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea
Rule 33(c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules provides:
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw defendant 'splea.
(Emphasis added).

1. Voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
a. Voluntary Plea

Hartshorn argues his Alford plea was not vol~mtxilyentered. He states: "The
defendant stated several times that he wasn't guilty of the charge of grand theft. The plea
was not made volui~taryand the defendant didn't have the full uilderstanding of nature of
the act." M. to Withdraw Alford Plea at 2. He also states: "The defendant was not told
by counsel the severity of the consequences of being sentenced that day." M. to
Withdraw Alford Plea at coiltinued page 3.
"Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in compliance with
constitutional due process standards, w l ~ i crequire
l~
that a guilty plea be entered
voluntarily, lulowingly, and intelligently." State v. HufJinan, 137 Idaho 886, 857, 55 P.3d
879. 850 (Ct. App. 2002). The defendant bears the burden of deinonstrating he should be
allowed to withdraw t11e plea. State v. Dye, 124 Idaho 250, 254, 858 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct.
App. 1993).

MEI\4ORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO MrITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM DECISION - 3

The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained:
Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must satisfy itself that
the plea is offered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The plea must
be entered with "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence." In Idaho, the trial court must follow the minimum
requirements of I.C.R. 1l(c) in accepting pleas of guilty. If the record
indicates the trial court followed the requirements of I.C.R. 1I (c), this is a
prima facie showing that the plea is voluntary and knowing. The
defendant then has the burden of persuasion to demonstrate a manvest
injustice by establishing that the plea was induced by misapprehension,
inadvertence or ignorance.

State 1). Hayes, 138 Idaho 761,765, 69 P.3d 181, 185 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added).
Rule 1 1(c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules provides:
Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the
record of the entire proceedings, including reasoilable inferences drawn
therefrom, must show:
(1) The voluntariness of the plea.

(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea,
includiilg minimum and maximum punisllments, and other direct
coilsequeilces which may apply.
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the
defendant would waive the right against con~pulsoryself-incrimination,
the right to trial by jury, and the right to confiont witnesses against the
defendant.

(4) The defendant was inforined of the nature of the charge against
the defendant.

(5) Whether any pronlises have been made to the defendant, or
whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the
nature of the agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court
is not bound by any promises or recommendation from either paity as to
punishment.
During the December 4, 2006, arraignment, the Court participated in the
following dialogue with Hartshorn and his attorney, Jeron~yStafford:
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Judge St. Clair: And in the 19594 case, you're charged with grand theft
in count one and aggravated assault in count two. If you're convicted of
the grand theft, you could be sentenced from one to fourteen years in
prison, fined up to $5,000 and required to pay restitution. If you're
convicted of count two, you could be sentenced up to five years in prison,
$5,000 fine and restitution. All of these may require a contribution of $50
to the victim's relief fund. And if you're convicted of more than one count
the sentences could be consecutive. Do you understand those potential
penalties for conviction of any of these charges in these cases?
Hartshorn: Yes, I do.

Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hartshorn did you get a copy of the inforination in
these three cases that describes the charges?
Hartshorn: Yes, I did.
Judge St. CIair: Did you read the infornlations?
Hal-tshorn: Yeah, I did.
Judge St. Clair: You have the right to have me read them to you out loud
here in court. Would you like me to read them?
Hartshorn: No, sir.

Judge St. Clair: And in Case 19594 how do you plead to grand theft Mr.
Hartshorn?
Hartshorn: Guilty.
Judge St. Clair: And the state is going to dismiss Ag Assault, is that
right?
Larren Covert: Yes, your honor
Judge St. Clair: We'll put it down a not guilty plea in that charge. So did
you read and sign this plea agreement Mr. Hai-tshorn?
Hartshorn: Yes, I did.
Judge St. CIair: Did you read it?
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Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand it?
Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Do you have any questions?
Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: This has a sentencing recon~mendatioilthat the sentences
be concurrent except the escape which must be consecutive and that the
state would recominend six months fixed on escape. Do you understand
that?
Hartshorn: Yes, I do.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that the state's recomn~endationas to
sentencing would not be binding on me as to the proper punishment in
these three cases?
Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: You understand that if I did not go along with the state's
recommendation and gave you more severe sentences, you could not
withdraw your guilty pleas and go to trial?
Hartshorn: Yes sir, I do.

Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hartshorn, are you on probation or parole?
Hartshorn: Yes, I am.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that a conviction in any of these cases
would be a violation of that probation or parole?
Hartshol-n: Yes, sir.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that you could have your parole
revoked and your probation revoked as a result of more convictions in
these cases?
Hartshorn: Yes, sir.
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Judge St. Clair: Are you under the influence of any alcohol or any drugs
at this time?

Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: Do you have mental or psycl~ologicalproblems that have
a bearing on these cases?

Hal-tshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody pressure you into entering into any plea
agreement?

Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: Are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily?

Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Is anybody forcing you to plead guilty?

Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody promise you I would be easy on you if you
pleaded guilty?

Hartshorn: No, sir.
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody promise you I would put you on probation
if you pleaded guilty?

Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody threaten you or people close to you to inalte
you plead guilty?

Hartshorn: No
Judge St. Clair: Other than the plea agreement, did anyone offer you ally
rewards of any kind?

Hartshorn: No, sir.
Judge St. Clair: Are you pleading guilty to these crinles based on your
own free will and without pressure or influence from anybody
whatsoever?
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Hartshorn: Yes, sir.

Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that before sentencing I will have a
pre-sentencing investigation completed resulting in a written report with
your prior criminal record.
Hartshorn: Yes.

Judge St. Clair: Do you understand I will consider that at time of
sentencing?
Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that by pleading guilty to these
crimes you are giving up several very important constit~~tional
rights,
including the right to a jury trial on each of these crimes? The right to
confront and cross-examine the state's witnesses and the right to call your
own witnesses under oath?

Hartshorn: Yes.

Judge St. Clair: Do you understand you will have to give up your
privilege against self-incrin~inatioand give me the factual basis of these
three crimes?
Hartshorn: Yes.

Judge St. Clair: Do you still wish to plead guilty?
Hartshorn: Yes, I do.

Judge St. Clair: Alright, then I find that you do understand the nature of
these three crimes to which you have pleaded guilty. I find that you
~lnderstandthe coilsequences of these guilty pleas. I find there is a factual
basis for each of the three guilty pleas. I find that they were fieely and
volulltarily made. I will accept the three guilty pleas. . . .
Transcribed by Court.
The plea agreement, signed by Hartshorn, stated:
c. I understand that the crime of Grand Theft is a Felony, and is
punishable as follows:
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i. Imprisonment in the coullty jail for a term up to fourteen
years;
ii. A fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000);
iii. Restitution; or
iv. Any combination of fine, imprisonment, and restitution as
listed above.
Plea Agreement at 3.
During the arraignment, Judge St. Clair complied with all the requirements of
I.C.R. 1l(c). The Court's dialogue with Hartshorn during the arraignment provides a
prima facie showing that Hartshorn7sAlford plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made. Hartshorn acknowledged in the plea agreement that he was aware of
the maximum sentence for Grand Theft. Hartshorn has not submitted any evidence that
would indicate his plea was induced by misapprehension, inadvertence or ignorance.
Therefore, Hartshori~has not rebutted the prinla facie showing that his Alford plea was
voluntarily, lulowingly and intelligently made.
b. Persistent Violator Charge
Hartshori~appears to argue his Alford plea was coerced. He states: "The
defendant, in the above mentioned cause, after pre-trial discussions with the defense
lawyer and prosecuter, was told that if he didn't plead guilty to grand theft he was to be
charged with the persistent violator." M. to Withdraw Alford Plea at 2.
In Stone 1). State, 108 Idaho 822, 824-25,702 P.2d 860, 862-63 (Ct. App. 1985),
the Idaho Court of Appeals held:
Stone . . . alleges that the prosecutor threatened to charge Stone as
an habitual offender and represented that an additional twenty-six counts
could be filed in federal court if he did not plead guilty. Stone, however,
MEh4ORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND
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does not allege that these additional charges were groundless, only that
they were not filed. It is clear from the record that Stone was aware his
prior felony convictions made it possible for him to be charged by the
state as a persistent violator and to receive a life sentence. See I.C. tj 192514. He thus does not contend that the prosecutor's conduct was
fraudulent. A prosecutor is at liberty to use the availability of filing
additional, legitimate charges as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations.
"A guilty plea induced by a prosecutorial ... promise to refiain froin filing
additional charges does not necessarily vitiate an otherwise voluntary
plea." State v. Swindell, 93 Wash.2d 192, 607 P.2d 852, 855 (1980).
"Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other
procedural safeguards are presuinptively capable of intelligent choice in
response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false
self-condemnation." Bordenkircher I). Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct.
663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Stone admits his counsel was present
when the "threats" were made. He does not allege any other facts which
would cast a shadow on the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Stone was
thus "pres~unptively capable of intelligent choice in response to
prosecutorial persuasion." He has therefore not alleged facts which, even
if true, would entitle him to relief. See Cooper v. State, supra.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also stated:
[Tlhere is a certain amount of coercion inherent in charging a defeildant
and bringing him before the court to declare his guilt or innocence.
During plea bargaining, there is little chance of coilstitutionally excessive
coercion, however, so long as the defendant is free to accept or reject the
prosecutor's offers.

Gar-zee 17. State, 126 Idaho 396, 399, 883 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 1994).
The prosecutor in this case was free to use the "threat" of a persistent violator
charge as a persuasive tool when negotiating the plea bargain with Hartshorn. Hartshoin
was represented by counsel and protected by various procedural safeguards. He was free
to accept or reject the prosecutor's offers. Hartsl~orn'sAlford plea is, therefore, presuined
to have been entered voluntarily.
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2. Factual basis inquiry
Hartshorn argues the court's acceptance of his plea was improper because the
court "did not inquire fully to the facts of the charge." M. to Withdraw AlJbrd Plea at
continued page 2.
The Idaho Coui-t of Appeals has explained that with an Alford plea, not only must
the plea be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, but a fourth requirement must
also be met:
[A]n accused may voluntarily consent to the inlposition of a piison
sentence despite a professed belief in his or her innocence, as long as a
factual basis for the plea is demonstrated by the state, and the accused
clearly expresses a desire to enter such a plea. In Idaho, there is no
general obligation to inquire into the factual basis of a guilty plea.
However, such an inquiry should be made if an Alford plea is accepted, or
if the court receives information before sentencing which raises an
obvious doubt as to guilt.
An~ersonv. State, 119 Idaho 994, 996, 812 P.2d 301, 303 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations

omitted).
During the December 4, 2006, arraignment, the Court inquired into the factual
basis of the grand theft charge against Hartshorn:
Judge St. Clair: And how about the last case-this
What happened there?

grand theft charge.

Hnrtshorn: I had my business. It was when I first started my business. A
guy that was working with me; I needed to get some stuff off the iilterilet
and sell them. Supposedly his girlfriend's mother, which I've never met
her, got a debit card. I paid 330 or 350 bucks. Ordered what I needed to
order and that was all it was used. I got burglarized and we thought that
that was stolen too. The card was supposed to have been just used the one
time and then I was told it wasn't ally good after that. Well, anyway I had
it in my safe and they stole my safe, so I figured that was gone with it.
Later when we nloved out of the shop I found it. I put it in my wallet and
that's where it's been. I don't know. I've been in and out of jail four or
five times in the last year and nobody ever said anything until this time.
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Stafford: Your honor, on this one we should probably do Alford, I think.
He's disputing that he stole it, but the owner of the card is claiming that
she didn't give him permission that to use it or have it so it's kind of a
factual dispute. I think he's agreeing to plead guilty for the benefits of this
plea agreement, getting the other charges dismissed, and due to the risk at
trial with her coming in and saying that he didn't have permission to have
it.
Judge St. Clair: Is that right Mr. Hartshorn?
Hartshorn: Yes, sir.
Judge St. Clair: And so you think that this Cheryl Beverland that she
would be testifying against you with respect to this particular card?
Hartshorn: I guess so. She said it happened a year ago. It's been inore
like two-and-a-half years ago.
Judge St. Clair: But you had it? You had her card in your wallet?
Hartshorn: Yes, I did.
Judge St. Clair: MTheil you were here in Idaho Falls, Idaho?
I-Iartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: On October 26, 2006?
Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: You didn't have any permission from her to have her
card in your wallet?
Hartshorn: No.
Transcribed by Court.
The Court's inquiry into the factual basis for the grand theft charge against
Hai-tshonl was sufficient to establish a basis for Hartshorn's Alford plea.
3. Specific Intent

Hartshoril argues he was never "told that the state had the burden of proving
intent." M. to Withdraw Alford Plea at continued page 3. He cites State v. Henderson,
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113 Idaho 41 1,744 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1987), in support of his argument that he should
have been informed that the state had the burden of proving intent. In Henderson, the
defendant argued the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw guilty plea.
Henderson based his motion to withdraw guilty plea on the grounds he had not been
infoimed, prior to entering the guilty plea, that the state needed to prove specific intent as

an element of grand theft. The Court of Appeals stated:
Before accepting a guilty plea, the court must satisfy itself that the
plea is offered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. I.C.R. 1l(c);
Fowler v. State, 109 Idaho 1002, 712 P.2d 703 (Ct.App.1985). A
voluntary plea cannot be made without disclosure to the accused of the
intent element of a specific intent crime. Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60,
625 P.2d 4 14 (198 1); Fowler v. State, supra; State v. Vasquez, 107 Idaho
1052,695 P.2d 437 (Ct.App. 1985).
We must examine the record of the proceedings at which the guilty
plea was taken and the record of prior proceedings to determine whether
the accused was adequately informed of the specific intent element. . . .

. . . Grand theft is a specific intent crime. . . .

As we have shown, the information itself did not specifically
inelltion an intent to deprive or an intent to defraud. It did not allege that
He~ldersoilknew or had reasoil to know that the cashier's checks were
false and forged and would not be paid when presented. Nothing in the
record shows that, when the guilty plea was entered, Henderson had been
told that if the case went to trial the state would have to prove the specific
illtent and knowledge required for a conviction under this statute. What
Henderson's trial counsel may have told Henderson about elenlents of
proof or possible defenses is not shown.
Id. at 4 12-413, 744 P.2d at 796-97. The coui-t held Heildersoil must be permitted
to withdraw his guilty plea.
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In this case, the State filed an amended information accusing Hartshorn of Grand
Theft on November 28,2006. The amended information reads:

COUNT I, GRAND THEFT, Felony
I.C. $5 18-2403,18-2407(1)(b)3
The defendant, CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN, on or about October 26,
2006, in Bonneville County, State of Idaho, did wrongfully take, obtain, or
withhold a financial transaction card from the owner, Cheryl Beverland,
with the intent to deprive the owner of such property or to appropriate the
same to himself. (14 years, $5,OOOfine, and restitution.)
(Underlined emphasis added).
During the December 4, 2006, arraigiul~ent,Hartshorn and Judge St. Clair
engaged in the following dialogue:
Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hartshorn did you get a copy of the illformatioil in
these three cases that describes the charges?
Hartshorn: Yes, I did.
Judge St. Clair: Did you read the informations?
Hartshorn: Yeah, I did.
Judge St. Clair: You have the right to have me read them to you out loud
here in court. Would you like me to read them?
Hartshorn: No, sir.

Unlike in Henderson, Hartshorn was advised by the specific language of the
amended illforillation that intent was a required element of grand theft. Consequently, his
Alfol-d plea was made voluntarily, lcnowingly and intelligeiltly

B. Motion to Recoiisider

Hartshorn filed an objection to the Coui-t's September 20, 2007, Meinorailduin
Decisioil Re: Motions for Credit for Time Served. This Court assumes Hartshorn intends
his objectioil as a motion for reconsideration. In support of his Motion for Credit for
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Time Served, Hartshorn cites State v. Hernandez, 120 Idaho 785, 820P.2d 380, for the
proposition that a defendant who receives credit for time served on one cllarge should be
credited with an equal amount of time served on all other charges being served
concurrently with the first charge. Hartshorn states:
If ail sentences are running concurreilt except for the escape
charge, shouldn't I get 321 days jail credit on all charges that run
concurrent to my original sentence? The consecutive one year fixed for
escape with 113 days to begin after the original sentence imposed is how it
should be.
Aff. of Defendant at attaclment #2. Hartshorn appears to be arguing that he should
receive 321 days credit on Cases No. CR-06- 17236 and CR-06-19594.
The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this issue in State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho
67, 122 P.3d 1167 (Ct. App. 2005). In Vasquez, the defendant was arrested for

possession of a controlled substance in Payette County. One month later, Vasquez was
served with an arrest warrant from Washington County while still incarcerated in Payette
County. Vasquez was seiltenced in Payette County on July 10, 2003. On the same day,
Vasquez was transpol-ted to Washington County and arraigned on the charges pending
against hiin there. He was seilteilced in Washington Couilty on August 11, 2003. The
Washington County sentences were ordered to run concurreiltiy with the Payette County
sentence. Vasquez received credit for the thirty-two days he served in Washiilgton
County on the Washington County sentence. He filed a inolion for credit for time served
arguing that because the sentences were ordered to run concurrentiy, he was entitled to
prejudgment credit on his Washingtoil County sentence for the time served in Payette
Cou11ty.
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The court in Vasquez stated:
The award of credit for time served is governed by I.C.
which provides in part:

5

18-309

In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom
the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for
any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such
incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which
the judgment was entered.
The statute's phrase "if such incarceration was for the offense or
an included offense for which the judgment was entered" means that the
right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment incarceration is a
consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the
sentence is imposed. State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850, 865 P.2d 176,
177 (Ct.App. 1993); Hale, 116 Idaho at 765, 779 P.2d at 440. Thus, there
must be a causal effect between the offense and the incarceration in order
for the incarceration to be "for" the offense, as the term is used in I.C. 5
18-309.
Id. at 68, 122 P.3d at 1 168

The J/asquez court distinguished Hernandez, explaining:
There is a distinction between the defendant in Hernandez and the
defendant in Horn and Vasquez, namely that Hernandez was charged in
one county under one multi-count indictment, whereas Vasquez and Horn
were charged for crimes in different counties on separate c,o~nplaintsfor
unrelated acts. When charges are concurrently filed, the prejudginent
incarceration is caused by each charge. On the other hand, when the
charges are not concurrently filed but rather brought by different
complaints for unrelated charges in separate counties, the iilcarceration is
not a coilsequence of all charges even if the sentences are subsequently
ordered to run concui~ently. In sl~ort,a defendant wroilgfully receives
duplicative credit for prejudgment incarceration when the iilcarceration is
credited to each concurrent sentence but is attributable to oilly one charge
and not the other.

. . . [Tlhe fact that Vasquez was given the benefit of concurrent sentences
does not mean that he gets the additional benefit of prejudgillellt
incarceration attributable to a completely separate crime committed in
another county.
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Id. at 69, 122 P.3d at 1169.
In this case, Hartshorn pled guilty and was sentenced on four unrelated charges.
His prejudgment incarceration in Cases No. CR-06- 17236 and CR-06- 19594 was not
related to his prejudgment incarceration in Case No. CR-06-5769. The Cotu-t gave
Hartshorn the benefit of allowing him to serve his time for the three separate cases
concurrently. Hartshorn is not, however, entitled to apply the credit he received for time
served only under Case No. CR-06-5769 to Cases No. CR-06-17236 and CR-06-19594.
I-Iartshorn also argues Vasquez is distinguishable from his case because Vasquez
was charged in different counties, whereas he was charged only in Bonnevilie County.
Hartshorn nlisinterprets Vasquez. The focus of the court's holding in Vclsqziez
was that a defendant does not receive the benefit of credit for time served on concurrent
sentences when his prejudgment iilcarceration for one of the charges was "attributable to
a completely separate crime." The fact Vasquez's charges were filed in separate couilties
is not relevant. The fact the charges in Hartshorn's cases were brought by different
coinpiaiilts and for unrelated charges provides the basis for application of the Vasquez
decision in this action.
The Court's Septeinber 20, 2007, memorandum decision correctly denied
Hal-tshorn's motions for credit for time served. Hartshorn's motion for reconsideration
should be denied.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Hartshorn's motion to withdraw Alford plea should be denied.
Hartshorn's motion for reconsideration should be denied.
.v

DATED this

'Z0

day of March 2008.
&jiAq#, -A
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-

GREGORY S. ANDERSON
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

day of March 2008, I did send a true and
I hereby certify that on this
correct copy of the foregoing documeilt upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse
mailbox; or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Curtis Glenn Hartshorn
ISCI Unit 14
Post Office Box 14
Boise, ID 83707
Bonneville County Prosecutor's Office
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Fails, ID 83402

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Boruleville County, Idaho
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD AND KEEP
SUSPENSION OF BRIEFING SCHEDULE
IN PLACE

1

v.

)

CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 33914-2007
(33915-2007133916-2007133917-2007)
Bonneville County District Court Nos. 20065769 (2006-1432712006-1723612006-19594)

A M-OTION TO AUGMENT RECORD AND MOTION TO KEEP SUSPENSION OF
BRIEFING SCHEDULE IN PLACE with attachment was filed by counsel for Appellant on
November 24,2008. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD be, and
hereby is, GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the transcript listed
below with this Court within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order and the District Court
Clerk shall immediately serve counsel and file the transcript with this Court. Any corrections shall
be filed with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30.1 :

' 1. Transcript of the February 12, 2008, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Withdraw his
plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents

~

listed below, items which were NOT submitted with this Motion and not contained in this record on
appeal, and the District Court Clerk shall submit to this Court the requested documents at the same

-

time as the transcript listed above:
I. Court Minutes from the February 12, 2008, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Withdraw

his plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594; and
' 2 . The district court's March 20, 2008, Memorandum Decision denying Appellant's

"dotion to Withdraw his plea in Bonneville County Case No. CR-2006-19594.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that proceedings in t h s appeal shall remain SUSPENDED
until the transcript and the requested documents listed above are filed with this Court, at which time
the due date for filing Appellant's Brief shall be reset.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD AND KEEP SUSPENSION'OF BRIEFING SCHEDULE IN PLACE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1
1
j

Case NO. CR-2006-19594

1
1

MINUTE ENTRY

)

CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN'
Defendant.

1
1
1
1

This matter came on for hearing on defendant's Objection & Verified Motioll for
Disqualification with Cause and Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea on February 12, 2008 at 9:30
A.M., before the Hoilorable Gregoi-y S. Anderson, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho
Falls, Idaho.
Ms. Karen Konvaliillta, Court Reporter: and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk,
were present.
Mr. Randolph Neal appeased on behalf of the State.
The defendant appeared by telephone on his ow11 behalf.
The Coui-t noted that the defendant's illation for disqualification was resolved.
Mr. Hartshom presented argument suppol-ting his request for credit for time served. Mr.
Neal argued in opposition to defendant's request for credit. Mr. Hai"c11om presented additional
arguille~ltsuppoiting the motion.
The Court took the matter under advisement.
Mr. Hartshorn presented argunlent supporting his ~llotionto withdraw his guilty plea. Mr.

hlINU1'E ENTRY - I

Neal argued in opposition to defendant's motion. Mr. Hal-tsllom presented additional argulllellt
su~pgortingdefendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea.
The Court took tlle matter under advisement.
Court was thus adjourned.

r
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GREGORY S. ANDERSON
District Judge
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STATE OF IDAHO.
Plaintiff.
-vs.CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN.
Defendant.
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1
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Case No. CR-06- 19594
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RTEMORANDUM DEClSION RE:
MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD
PLEA AND OBJECTION TO
MEMORANDUM DECISION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 18. 2006. Curtis Hal-tsholll was se~ltellcedin Cases No. CR-20065769 for delivery of a colltrolled substa~lce,CR-2006- 14327 for escape, CR-2006- 1 7236
for issuing a check without funds and CR-2006-19594 for grand theft. Each case is
unrelated to the others.
In Case No. CR-2006-5769, the court revolted probation and inlposed the original
selltellce of a tlu-ee-year deter~ninatetern1 followed by an indeterminate term of seven
years. The sentence is subject to 321 days credit for time served prior to sentencing.
In Case No. CR-2006-14327, the court selltellced Hartshorn to a one-year
deterlllillate term to be served collsecutively to the se~ltellcein Case No. CR-2006-5769.
The selltellce is subject 10 1 13 days credit for time served prior to sentencing.
In Case No. CR-2006-17236, the Court selltellced Hartshorn to a determinate term
of t h e e years to be served collcurrelltly with the sentence in Case No. CR-2006-5769.

The sentence is subject to 113 days credit for time served prior to sentencing.
In Case No. CR-2006-19594, the Court selltellced Hartshorn to a minin~umterm
offour years to be follou~edby an illdetermillate tell11 of eight years. The sellte~lceis to
hdEh4ORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO M7ITHDRAJA7ALFORD PLEA AND
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be served concurrently with the sente~lcesin Cases No. CR-2006-5769 and CR-200617236. The se~ltellceis subject to 1 13 days credit for time served prior to sentencing.
On Septenlber 13, 2007, Hartshorn filed an identical nlotioll for credit for time
serlled in each of the listed cases.
On September 20, 2007, the court entered a Men1orandu1l.lDecision Re: L4otions
for Credit for Time Served, which denied Hartshorn's motions.
Hal-tshosn filed a Motion to V\Tithdraw Alford Plea on October 1. 2007.
On October 16, 2007, Hartshorn filed an Objection and Verified h4otion for
Disqualification WICause objecting to the Septenlber 20, 2007, Menloralldunl Decision.'

11. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION
A. Motion to Withdraw AIford Plea
The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the
discretion of the trial court. State v. Dye, 124 Idaho 250, 253, 858 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct.
App. 1993).

B. Motion to Reconsider
"The decision to grant or deny a request for recollsideratio~lgenerally rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan

I). Becks,

135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908,

914 (2001): Cnrnell I, Barker Mnnageme17t,h e . , 137 Idaho 322, 329. 48 P.3d 651, 658
(2002).

I An Order for Self Disqualificatio~~
was entered on October 3. 2007 by Judge Tinge).. On October 10,
2007, Judge Anderson was assigned this case. Consequently, Hartshoin's Motion for Disqualificatio~~
is
moot and need not be addressed in this decision. Hartshorn's Objection appears to be a motion for
reconsideration and will be handled as such by this Court.
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111. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Withdraw Alforrl Plea
Rule 33(c) of the Idaho CI-iminal Rules provides:
V4ithdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A nlotio~lto withdraw a plea of
guilty may be made only before sentence is inlposed or imposition of
sentence is suspended; hut io c o ~ ~ ~ -nzu17ifesf
ect
inj~tsiice/he COUI-I affer
se~zlence mujl set aside tlie jztd,onzei7/ of conviction und yem7ii [he
deferzdunt to ~lithdraw~
defendant 's plea.
(Emphasis added).

1. Voluntarily, knowingly and intelligentlj~
a. Voluntary Plea

Hal-tshorn argues his A(fo1.d plea was not voluntarily entered. He states: "The
defendant stated several times that he wasn't guilty of the charge of grand theft. T l ~ eplea
was not made voluntary and the defendant didn't have the full understa~ldingof nature of
the act." M, to Withdram7 Alford Plea at 2. He also states: "Tlle defendant was not told
that day." h4. to
by cou~lselthe severity of the consequences of being se~lte~lced
Nrithdraw Alford Plea at coilti~luedpage 3.
"Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in complisu~cewith
constitutio~laldue process standards, mihich require that a guilty plea be entered
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." State v. Huffinan, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d
879, 850 (Ct. App. 2002). Tlle defendant bears the burden of demonstrating he should be
allowed to withdram7 the plea. Stare

I).

Dye, 124 Idaho 250, 254, 858 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct.
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The Ida110 Court of Appeals has explained:
Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court nlust satisfjl itself that
the plea is offered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The plea nlust
be entered with "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence." In Idaho, the trial court nlust follow the ~ n i ~ l i m u ~ l l
requirenlents of I.C.R. I 1(c) in accepting pleas of guilty I f the I-ecord
ind~catestlze trial cozn.t.follo~~~ed
the requirenle17t~o f I C R 11 (c), tl7is is a
pri111a facie showling tl~al thc yleu is ~)oIuntalynnd know777g
The
defendant ~ I T C MI7as the bzn-den of yers~lusio17to demor7sirate u 177anifesi
rlzjz~sticeby establrshing tlzui ihe plea was ilzdz~cedby 177isapyrei7el7~1on,
inah)ertence or zgnoralzce
Stare

I!.

Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 765, 69 P.3d 181. 185 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added).

Rule 1 1(c) of the Idaho Crinlinal Rules provides:
Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the
record of the entire proceedings, i~lcludingreasonable i~lferellcesdrav,a
therefrom, nlust show:
(1) The volu~ltarinessof the plea.
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea,
including ~nininiulll and ~naxinlu~npunishments, and other direct
consequences which may apply.
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the
defenda~ltwould waive the right against con~pulsoryself-incrimination,
the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses against the
defendant.
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the cl~argeagainst
the defendant.
(5) Whether ally pronlises have been made to the defendant, 01.
whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the
nature of the agreement and that the defendant was inforlned that the court
is not bound by any promises or reconvllendatioll from either party as to
punislul~ent.
During the December 4, 2006, a r a i g m e n t , the Court participated in the
following dialogue with Hartshorn and his attorney, Jeromy Stafford:
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Judge St. Clair: And in the 19594 case, you're charged 1vit11 grand theft
in coullt one and aggravated assault in count two. If you're convicted of
the grand theft, you could be sentenced from one to fourteen years in
prison, fined up to $5.000 and required to pay restitution. If you're
comlicted of coulll two, you could be selltellced up to five years in prison,
$5,000 fine and restitution. All of these may require a contributio~lof $50
to the victim's relief fund. And if you're convicted of more than one count
the sentences could be consecutive. Do you ullderstand those potential
penalties for co~lvictio~l
of ally of these charges in these cases?
Hartshorn: Yes, I do.

Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hartshorl did you get a copy of the illfor~natiollin
these t h e e cases that describes the charges?
Hartshorn: Yes, I did.
Judge St. Clair: Did you read the infornlations?
Hartshorn: Yeah, I did.
Judge St. Clair: You have the right to have me read them to you out loud
here in court. Would you like me to read them?
Hartshorn: No, sir.

Judge St. Clair: And in Case 19594 how do you plead to grand theft Mr.
Hartshor~~?
Hartshorn: Guilty
Judge St. Clair: And the state is going to disnliss Ag Assault, is that
right?
Larren Covert: Yes, your honor.
Judge St. Clair: We'll put it down a not guilty plea in that charge. So did
you read and sign this plea agreement Mr. Ha~-tshorn?
Hartshorn: Yes, I did.
Judge St. Clair: Did you read it?
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Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand it?

14artsho1-n:Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Do you have any questions?

Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: This has a sentencing reconullendatioll that the sentences
he concurrent except the escape which must be consecutive and that the
state would recolllnlend six montl~sfixed on escape. Do you ullderstand
that?

Hartshorn: Yes, I do.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that the state's recommendation as to
sentellcillg would not be binding on me as to the proper punishment in
these t h e e cases?

Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: You understand that if I did not go along with the state's
recon~nlelldation and gave you more severe sentences, you could not
withdraw your guilty pleas and go to trial?

Hartshorn: Yes sir, I do.

Judge St. Clair: Mr. Hastshorn, ase you on probation or parole?

Hartshorn: Yes, I an1
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that a convictioll in any of these cases
would be a violation of that probation or parole?

Hartshorn: Yes, sir.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that you could have your parole
revoked and your probation revolted as a result of more convictions in
these cases?

Hartshorn: Yes, sir
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW ALFORD PLEA AND
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Judge St. Clair: Are you under the influence of any alcol~olor any drugs
at this time?

Hartshol-n: No.
Judge St. Clair: Do you have melltal or psycl~ologicalproblems that have
a bearing on these cases?

Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody pl.essure you into entering into any plea
agreement?

Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: Are you pleading guilty fieely and voluntxily?

Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Is anybody forcing you to plead guilty?

Hartshorn: No.
,Judge St. Clair: Did anybody promise you I would be easy on you if you
pleaded guilty?

Har-tshorn:No, sir
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody promise you I would put you on probation
if you pleaded guilty?

Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: Did anybody threatell you or people close to you to make
you plead guilty?

Hartshorn: No.
Judge St. Clair: Other than the plea agreement, did anyone offer you ally
rewards of any ltind?

Hartshorn: No, sir.
Judge St. Clair: Are you pleading guilty to these crinles based on your
own free m7ill and ~ ~ i t h o upressure
t
or i~lfluellce fiom anybody
whatsoever?
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Hartshorn: Yes. sir.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that before sentellcing I will have a
pre-sentencing investigation conlpleted resulting in a written report with
your prior crinlinal record.
Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand I will consider that at time of
sentencing?
Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand that by pleading guilty to these
crinles you are giving up several very impel-tan1 constitutio~lalrights,
including the right to a jury trial on each of these crimes? Tlle right to
confront and cross-examine the state's witnesses and the right to call your
own witnesses under oath?
Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Do you understand you will have to give up your
privilege against self-incrimination and give me the factual basis of these
t h e e crimes?
Hal-tshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: Do you still wish to plead guilty?
Hartshorn: Yes, I do.

Judge St. Clair: Alright, then I find that you do understand the nature of
these t h e e crimes to which you have pleaded guilty. I find that you
understand the consequences of these guilty pleas. I find there is a factual
basis for each of the three guilty pleas. I find that they were freely and
voluntarily made. I will accept the three guilty pleas. . . .
Transc,ribed by Court.
The plea agreement, signed by Hartshorn, stated:
c. I understand that the crime of Grand Theft is a Felony. and is
punishable as follows:
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i.

I~nprisolune~lt
in the county jail for a term up to fourteen
years;

ii. A fine of not lllore than five thousa~lddollars ($5,000);
iii. Restitution; or
iv. Any combination of fine, imprisolul~ent,and restitution as
listed above.
Plea Agreement at 3.
During the al-raig~ullent,Judge St. Clair complied with all the requirelnents of
1.C.R. I 1(c). T11e Court's dialogue with Nartshorn during the an-aiglunent provides a
prima facie showing that Hartshorn's Alfo7.d plea was \loluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made. Hal-tshorn acknowledged in the plea agreement that he was aware of
the maximum selltellce for Grand Theft. Hartshorn has not sublnitted any evidence that
would indicate his plea was induced by misapprehension, inadvel-tence or ignorance.
Therefore, Hal-tshonl has not rebutted the prima facie showing that his A1for.d plea was
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made
b. Persistent Violator Charge
Hartshor11appears to argue his Alford plea was coerced. He states: "The
defendant, in the above mentioned cause, after pre-trial discussio~ls~ v i t hthe defense
lawyer and prosecuter, was told that if he didn't plead guilty to grand theft he was to be
charged with the persistent violator." h4, to Withdraw Alford Plea at 2.
In Stone I: State, 108 Idaho 822, 824-25, 702 P.2d 860, 862-63 (Ct. App. 1?85),
the Ida110 Court of Appeals held:
Stone . . . alleges that the prosecutor tlweatened to charge Stone as
an habitual offender and represented that an additional twenty-six coullts
could be filed in federal court if he did not plead guilty. Stone, however;
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does not allege that these additional charges were groundless, only that
they were not filed. It is clear from the record that Stone was aware his
prior felony convictions made it possible for him to be charged by the
state as a persistent violator and to receive a life sentence. See I.C. 5 192514. He thus does not contend that the prosecutor's conduct was
fraudulent. A prosecutor is at liberty to use the availability of filing
additional, legitimate charges as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations.
"A guilty plea induced by a prosecutorial ... pronlise to refrain from filing
additional charges does not necessarily vitiate an otl~erwisevoluntary
j'lea." State 11. S~)irzdell,93 Wasl1.2d 192, 607 P.2d 852, 855 (1980).
"Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other
procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of i~ltelligentchoice in
response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false
self-condenmation." Bordelzkir-cher v. Hajm, 434 U.S. 357, 363. 98 S.Ct.
663. 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Stone admits his counsel was present
when the "threats" were made. He does not allege any other facts which
would cast a shado\v on the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Stone was
thus "presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to
prosecutorial persuasion." He has therefore not alleged facts which. even
if true, would entitle him to relief. See Cooper v. State, supra.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also stated:
[Tlhere is a certain amount of coercion inherent in charging a defendant
and bringing him before the court to declare his guilt or innocence.
During plea bargaining, there is little chance of constitutionally excessive
coercion, however, so long as the defendant is free to accept or reject the
prosecutor's offers.
Gar-zee 11. State, 126 Idaho 396, 399, 883 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 1994).

The prosecutor in this case was free to use the "threat" of a persistent violator
charge as a persuasive tool when negotiating the plea bargain with Hartshorn. I-Iartshorn
was represented by counsel and protected by various procedural safeguards. He was free
to accept or reject the prosecutor's offers. Ha~-tshorn'sAlford plea is, therefore, presunled
to have been entered voluntarily.
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2. Factual basis inquiry

I-lal-tshorn argues the court's acceptance of his plea was improper because the
court "did not inquire fully to the facts of the charge." M. to Withdra\v Alford Plea at
conti~luedpage 2
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained that with an Alfo7.d plea, not only nlust
the plea be voluntal-ily, knowingly and intelligently made, but a fourth requirement must
also be met:
[Aln accused may volunlarily conse~ltto the inlposition of a prison
se~ltencedespite a professed belief in his or her i~mocence,as long as a
factual basis for the plea is denlonstrated by the state, and the accused
clearly expresses a desire to enter such a plea. In Idaho, there is 110
general obligation to inquire into the factual basis of a guilty plea.
However, such an inquiry should be made if an Alford plea is accepted. or
if the court receives information before sentencing wl~ich raises an
obvious doubt as to guilt.
Arnersor7 v. State, 119 Idaho 994, 996, 8 12 P.2d 301, 303 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations

omitted).
During the December 4, 2006, arraignment, the Court inquired into the factual
basis of the grand theft charge against Hartshorn:
Judge St. Clail-: And how about the last case-this
What happened there?

grand theft charge.

Hal-tshorn: I had 1nj7business. It was wllen I first started my business. A
guy that was working with me; I needed to get some stuff off the internet
and sell them. Supposedly his girlfriend's mother, which I've never met
her, got a debit card. I paid 330 or 350 buclts. Ordered what I needed to
order and that was all it was used. I got burglarized and we thought that
that \vas stolen too. T11e card was supposed to have been just used the one
time and then I was told it wasn't any good after that. Well, anyway 1 had
it in my safe and they stole my safe, so I figured that was gone with it.
Later when we moved out of the shop I found it. I put it in my wallet and
that's where it's been. I don't kllow. I've been in and out of Jail four or
five tinles in the last year and nobody ever said anything until this time.
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Stafford: Your honor, on this one we should probably do Alford, I thinli.
He's disputing that he stole it. but the owner of the card is claillling that
she didn't give him pernlission that to use it or have it so it's kind of a
factual dispute. I think he's agreeing to plead guilty for the benefits of this
plea agreenlent, getting the othel- charges dismissed. and due to the risk at
l g and saying that he didn't have perlnission to have
trial with her c o n ~ i ~ in
it.
Judge St. Clair: Is that right h4r. Na~-tshorn?
Hartshorn: Yes, sir.
Judge St. Clair: And so you think that this Cheryl Beverland that she
would be testieing against you with respect to this particular card?
Hartshorn: I guess so. She said it happened a year ago. It's been nlore
like two-and-a-half years ago.
Judge St. Clair: But you had it? You had her card in your wallet?
Hartshorn: Yes, I did.
Judge St. Clair: Mihen you were here in Idaho Falls, Idaho?
Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: On October 26, 2006?
Hartshorn: Yes.
Judge St. Clair: You didn't have any per~llissionfrom her to have her
card in your wallet?
Hartshorn: No.
Transcribed by Court.
The Court's inquiry into the factual basis for the grand theft charge against
Ha~-tshornwas sufficient to establish a basis for Hartshorn's AlJbrd plea.
3. Specific Intent

Hartshor~~
argues he was never "told that the state had the burden of proving
intent.'' M. to MJithdrawA1for.d Plea at continued page 3. He cites Srnle

1,.

Henderson.
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1 1 3 Idaho 41 1 , 744 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1957), in support of his al-gument that he should

have been informed that the state had the burden of proving intent. In He17der.sol7:the
defendant argued the trial court erred u/hen it denied his ~notiollto withdraw guilty plea.
I-Ienderson based his motion to withdraw guilty plea on the grounds he had not been
infonlled. prior to entering the guilty plea, that the state needed to prove specific intent as
an elenle~llof grand theft. The Court of Appeals stated:

Before accepting a guilty plea, the caul-t lllust satisfi itself that the
plea is offered v o l ~ ~ n t a r i lu~o~vingly
l~~,
and intelligently. I .C.R. 11(c):
Fo~~vler.
v. State, 109 Idaho 1002, 712 P.2d 703 (Ct.App.1985). A
voluntary plea cannot be 111ade without disclosure to the accused of the
intent element of a specific illtent crime. Syarr.ol.ri1). State, 102 Idaho 60,
625 P.2d 414 (1 98 1); Folder 1). Slate, supra; State 1). Trasquez, 107 Idaho
1052,695 P.2d 437 (Ct.App. 1985).
We must examine the rec,ord of the proceedings at which the guilty
plea was talcen and the record of prior proceedings to deternline \vllether
the accused was adequately informed of the specific intent element. . . .

. . . Grand theft is a specific intent crime.

As we have shown, the infoll~lation itself did not specifically
~nentiollan intent to deprive or an intent to defraud. It did not allege that
Henderson l u ~ e wor had reason to know- that the cashier's checlts were
false and forged and ~vouldnot be paid when presented. Nothing in the
record shows that, when the guilty plea was entered. Henderson had been
told that if the case went to trial the state would have to prove the specific
intent and knowledge required for a conviction under this statute. ITrhat
Henderson's trial counsel may have told Henderson about elenlents of
proof or possible defenses is not shown.
Id. at 412-413, 744 P.2d at 796-97. The court held Henderson must be permitted

to withdraw his guilty plea.
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111 this case, the State filed an anlended inforn~ationaccusing Hal-tshorn of Grand
Theft on November 28, 2006. The amended information reads:
COUNT I, GRAND THEFT, Felony
I.C. $5 18-2403,18-2407(1)(b)3

The defendant, CURTIS GLENN HARTSHORN, on or about October 26,
2006, in Bonneville County. State of Idaho, did wrongfully take. obtain, or
witllhold a financial transaction card from the owner, Cheryl Beverland,
with the intent to deprive the owner of such property or to appropriate the
same to himself. (14 years, $5,OOOfine. c/nd restitution )
(Underlined emphasis added).
Hal-ts1101-n and Judge St. Clair
During the December 4, 2006, arraig~ul~ent,
engaged in the f o l l o ~ ~ i ndialogue:
g
Judge St. Clair: h4r. Ha~-tshomdid you get a copy of the infornlation in
these t h e e cases that describes the charges?
Hartshorn: Yes. I did.
Judge St. Clair: Did you read the infornlations?
Hartshorn: Yeah, I did.
Judge St. Clair: You have the right to have me read them to you out loud
here in court. lrould you like rile to read them?
Hartshorn: No, sir

Unlike in Henderson, Ha~-tshornwas advised by the specific language of the
amended infornlation that intent was a required elenlent of grand theft. Consequentl~~,
his
Alford plea was made voluntarily, lu~o\vinglyand intelligently.

B. Motion to Reconsider
Hartsho~ilfiled an objection to the Court's September 20. 2007, Menlora~ldunl
Decision Re: Motions for Credit for Time Served. This Court assunles Ha1-tshor11intends
his objection as a motion for reconsideration. In suppo~tof his h4otion for Credit for
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Time Served, Hartshorn cites State

1).

Her-~zandez.120 Idaho 785, 820P.2d 3 80, for the

propositio~lthat a defendant \\rho receives credit for time served 011 one charge should be
credited with an equal amount oftime served on all other charges being served
c o ~ l c ~ ~ ~ r ewith
n t l ythe first charge. I-Iartshon~states:
If all sentences are ru~lning concul~ent except for the escape
charge, shouldn't I get 321 days jail credit on all charges that run
concurrent to 111y origi~lalsentence? The consecutive one year fixed for
escape with 1 13 days to begin after the original sentence inlposed is ho\?l it
should be.
Aff. of Defendant at attaclmlellt #2. Hartshorn appears to be arguing that he should
receil~e321 days credit on Cases No. CR-06-17236 and CR-06-19594.
The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Slate v. Tfasquez, 142 Idaho
67, 133 P.3d 1167 (Ct. App. 2005). In Thsqtlez, the defendant was arrested for
possession of a controlled substance in Payette County. One month later, Vasquez was
s e r ~ ~ ewith
d an arrest warrallt from Washington County while still incarcerated in Payette
County. Vasquez was se~ltellcedin Payette County on July 10, 2003. On the sanle day,
Vasquez was transported to IATashington County and arsaigned on the charges pending
against him there. He was sentenced in Washington County 011 August 11, 2003. The
Washington County sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the Payette County
sentence. Vasquez received credit for the thirty-two days he sei-ved in Washington
County on the Washington County sentence. He filed a motion for credit for tinle served
arguing that because the sentences were ordered to run concurrently, he was entitled to
psejudgment credit on his Washington County sentence for the time served in Payette
Coullty.
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The could in T/clsqz.lez stated:
The award of credit for time served is governed by 1.C. 4 18-309
\vhich provides in part:
In conlputing the term of imprisolxnent, the person against whom
the judgnlent was entered, shall receive credit in the judgnlent for
any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment. if such
incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which
the j udg~nentwas entered.
The statute's p h a s e "if such incarceration was for the offense or
an included offense for which the judgment was entered" means that the
right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgmellt incarceration is a
consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the
sentence is imposed. State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850. 865 P.2d 176,
177 (Ct.App.1993); Hale, 116 Idaho at 765, 779 P.2d at 440. Thus. there
must be a causal effect between the offense and the incarceration in order
for the incarceration to be "for'' the offense, as the tern1 is used in I.C. 4
18-309.
Id. at 68, 122 P.3d at 1168.

The J/irsquez court distinguished Hernarzdez, explaining:
There is a distillction between the defendant in Herrzarzdez and the
defendant in Horn and Vasquez, namely that Hernandez was charged in
one county under one multi-count indictment, whereas Vasquez and Horn
were charged for crimes in different counties on separate c.omplaints for
unrelated acts. When charges are concurrently filed, the prejudgnlent
incarceratioll is caused by each charge. On the other hand, when the
charges are not concurrently filed but rather brought by different
complaints for unrelated charges in separate counties, the incarceratioll is
not a consequence of all charges even if the sentences. are subsequently
ordered to run concul~ently. In short, a defendant wrongfully receives
duplicative credit for prejudg~nentincarceratio~lwhen the incarceration is
credited to each concurre~ltsentence but is attributable to only one charge
and not the other.

. . . [Tlhe fact that Vasquez was given the benefit of concurrent sentences
does not nlean that he gets the additional benefit of prejudgn~ellt
incarceration attributable to a colnpletely separate crime comnlitted in
another county.
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Id at 69, 132 P.3d at 11 69.

In this case. Ha~lshornpled guilty and was se~ltencedon four unrelated chal-ges.
His prejudgment incarceration in Cases No. CR-06-17236 and CR-06-19594 was not
related to his prejudgnlent incarceration in Case No. CR-06-5769. The Court gave
Hartshorn the benefit of allo\ving hi111 to serve his time for the t h e e separate cases
concurrently. Hartshorn is not. however, entitled to apply the credit he received for time
served only under Case No. CR-06-5769 to Cases No. CR-06-17236 and CR-06-19594.
Hal-tshorn also argues T'asquez is distinguishable from his case because Vasquez
was charged in different counties, whereas he was charged only in B o ~ u l e ~ ~ County.
ille
Hartsl~onlnlisinterprets Tiasquez. The focus of the court's holding in J'nsqzre;
was that a defendant does not receive the benefit of credit for time served on concurrent
sentences when his prejudglnent incarceration for one of the charges was "attributable to
a con~pletelyseparate crime.'' The fact Vasquez's charges were filed in separate counties
is not relevant. The fact the charges in Hartshon~l'scases were brought by different
conlplaints and for unrelated charges provides the basis for application of the J'asques
decision in this action.
The Court's Septenlber 20, 2007. memora~~dumdecision correctly denied
Hartshorn's motions for credit for time served. Hartshonl" motioll for reconsideration
should be denied.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Hartshorn's ~llotio~l
to withdraw Alfol-d plea should be denied.
Hartshorn's lllotio11for reconsideration should be denied.
.,-

DATED this
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day of March 2008.
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GREGORY S. ANDERSON
District Judge
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correct postage thereon; by causing the saine to be placed in the respective cousthouse
mailbox; or by causing the saine to be hand-delivered.
Cul-tis Glenn Hartshonl
ISCI Unit 14
Post Office Box 14
Boise, ID 83707
Bo1lne\7illeCounty Prosecutor's Office
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bo~ulevilleCounty. Idaho
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